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Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy 
in a mixed oligopoly 
Seung-Leul Kim, Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura 
Abstract 
This article formulates a mixed oligopoly in which a public firm competes with two private 
firms that may adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR). We investigate the optimal 
privatization policy and find that, depending on the magnitude of CSR, the optimality of 
either nationalization or full privatization can hold. In particular, we show that the optimal 
degree of privatization is decreasing in the magnitude of CSR and thus nationalization can 
be optimal if they have homogeneous objectives. Under significant heterogeneity of the 
objectives among firms, however, the optimal degree of privatization is non-monotone with 
the magnitude of CSR, but full privatization can be optimal. This result suggests that the 
optimal privatization policy depends on both the magnitude of CSR and the heterogeneity of 
the objectives among private firms.  
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1. Introduction 
The trend of privatization has been increasing worldwide since the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
public and semi-public (partially privatized) firms are still important player in the global 
economic arena and highly concentrated in a few sectors with large portions of the world’s 
resources.1 In particular, public firms successfully compete with their private counterparts 
in a wide range of industries such as health care, education, financing (e.g., banking and 
insurance), transportation (e.g., railways and airlines), telecommunications, electricity, 
power generation, natural gas, and other energy-related industries. Given that it has become 
a common theme, privatization in such industries has attracted extensive policy attention 
from economics researchers in developed, developing, and transitional economies such as 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia including China.2  
Early analysis of mixed oligopolies dates back to at least Merrill and Schneider (1966), 
although it is only more recently that the literature in this field has become richer and more 
diverse. The literature on mixed oligopolies adopted the partial privatization model first 
formulated by Matsumura (1998), who discussed the optimal degree of privatization in 
mixed oligopolies. Since then, models of partial privatization have been analyzed within a 
rapidly growing literature and numerous recent works showed that various factors affect the 
                                                     
1 Referring to report by the OECD, Kowalski et al. (2013) noted that of the 2,000 largest public 
companies in the world, more than 10% are either public firms or have significant government 
ownership; these government-associated companies’ sales are equivalent to approximately 6% of the 
global GDP. More than half (in terms of value) of all public firms in OECD countries are significant 
players in energy-related industries. 
2 China has adopted privatization policy to reform its public firms since 1978 and thus, Chinese 
economists have paid considerable attention to the privatization and liberalization policies in social 
market economies. 
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optimal degree of privatization.3 However, most papers assumed that private enterprises 
having homogeneous objectives maximize their own profits.4 
On the other hand, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has now become the global 
mainstream business strategy. According to KPMG (2008, 2013), nearly 80% of the 250 
largest companies worldwide issued CSR reports in 2008 and more than 30% (71% and 
90%) of companies in the US (the UK and Japan, respectively) adopted CSR in 2013. While 
a large number of firms in the world issue various CSR statements/activities, many of them 
belong to the industries characterized as mixed oligopolies in which CSR-firms compete 
with public firms. It represents that the heterogeneity of objectives among private firms 
emerges as an important research topic in the literature.  
The recent topic on CSR has received increasing attention from broad research in both 
empirical and theoretical analyses in the areas of in business and economics.5 For example, 
some theoretical papers including Goering (2012, 2014), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand 
and Grothe (2013, 2015), Nakamura (2014), Chang, et al. (2014), Kopel (2015), Lambertini 
and Tampieri (2015) and Bian, et al. (2016) analyzed different models of oligopolies where 
profit-maximizing private firms compete with other private firms that adopt CSR activities. 
In particular, they utilized a model in which the private firm adopts consumer surplus as a 
proxy of its own CSR concerns. Then, a CSR-related incentive combines both profitability 
                                                     
3 For example, Lee, et al. (2013) and Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship between 
privatization and trade policies, while Lin and Matsumura (2012) and Cato and Matsumura (2012) 
considered the foreign penetration in private firms’ ownership. Wang and Chen (2010) and Chen 
(2017) mentioned the cost difference between public and private firms, while Wang and Tomaru 
(2015) and Xu, et al. (2016) noted the shadow cost of the soft budget in public firms. 
4 Matsumura and Okamura (2015) investigated a model in which private firms are concerned with 
other private firms’ profits. However, they did not consider the heterogeneity of the objectives among 
the private firms.   
5 For the intensive discussions on the economics of CSR, see Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), 
Crifo and Forget (2012) and Liu, et al. (2015). 
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and consumer surplus, and thus the objective of CSR-firm is a convex combination of 
consumers’ surplus and its own profits. 
Taking account of the fact that CSR is a growing trend in many industries including 
those characterized by mixed oligopolies, in which the investigation of privatization policies 
is significant, it is restrictive to assume that private firms have homogeneous objectives, 
wherein they maximize only their own profits. Therefore, it is urgent to examine the 
interactions between CSR activities of the private firms and optimal privatization policies on 
the public firm. In this research line, we adopt the formal approach of CSR and investigate 
how the heterogeneity of the objectives among the private firms affects the optimal 
privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly in which a public firm competes with CSR-firms. 
We show that, depending on the magnitude of CSR, either nationalization or full 
privatization can be the optimal policy. This result is strikingly contrast to the previous 
literature in mixed oligopoly. In fact, by focusing on different aspects of economic 
phenomena, many researches have analyzed the optimal partial privatization, which is firstly 
shown by Matsumura (1998) under moderate conditions in a homogeneous mixed duopoly, 
and proved that the optimality of partial privatization is strikingly robust.6  
The main contribution of our paper is to provide different results by investigating the 
optimal privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly with the CSR-firms. In particular, we find 
that the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in the magnitude of CSR in private 
firms and thus nationalization can be optimal if they have homogeneous objectives. If there 
is significant heterogeneity of the objectives among private firms, however, the optimal 
degree of privatization is non-monotone with respect to the magnitude of CSR but full 
                                                     
6 As exceptional works, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) and Xu, et al. (2017) provided the rationale on 
full nationalization policy in a free entry mixed oligopoly market. However, Cato and Matsumura 
(2012, 2015) showed that partial privatization is always optimal when the competitors are foreign.   
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privatization can be optimal. This result suggests that the optimal privatization policy 
depends on both the degree of CSR and the homogeneity of objectives among private firms. 
This highlights the role of homogeneity of objectives among private firms in choosing an 
optimal privatization policy and its effects on the non-monotonicity in privatization policies.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the basic model of mixed 
oligopolies with CSR. In section 3, we analyze the model and examine two specific cases 
where (i) both private firms have the homogenous CSR and (ii) one firm is a profit-
maximizer while the other firm adopts CSR. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Model  
We consider a mixed triopoly in which one public firm and two private firms that might 
engage in CSR activities produce homogenous products. The inverse demand function is 
given by P A Q  , where 20 1 iiQ q q   denotes market outputs, and 0q  and iq  are 
the outputs of the public firm and private firm i (i = 1, 2), respectively. Each firm’s cost 
function is assumed to be quadratic,7 21( )
2i i i
c q q . Then, social welfare is defined as 
2
0 ii
W CS    where 22QCS   is the consumer surplus and ( )i i i iPq c q    is each 
firm’s profit.  
The payoff of public firm 0 is given by 0 0(1 )U W    , where   ( 0 1  ) 
represents the degree of privatization, which is determined by the welfare-maximizing 
                                                     
7 The model with the linear demand and quadratic cost functions is considered as a standard and is 
popularly used in the literature on mixed oligopolies to rule out the uninteresting case of a public 
monopoly. De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015) provided the economic 
rationale behind this formulation. 
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benevolent government. That is, 0   indicates nationalization, 1   indicates full 
privatization, and (0,1)   indicates partial privatization.  
On the other hand, the payoff of the private firm is given by i i iU CS    where i  
( 0i  ) represents the degree of CSR, which is exogenously given. That is, CSR implies 
that the private firm is interested in consumers’ welfare in addition to its profit. Thus, when 
a private firm engaged in CSR or altruistic concern places a weight on consumer surplus in 
its objective function, it is analogous to assuming that the firm places a higher weight on 
output. Here, ߙ௜ ൌ 0 indicates a pure profit-maximizing private firm. We assume that 
1 20 2     to assure the interior solutions (i.e., all firms produce positive outputs) in 
the equilibrium.  
The two-stage game runs as follows: In the first stage, the government determines the 
optimal level of privatization,  , to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, after 
observing  , each firm chooses its output level 0q  and iq  at the same time. 
3. Analysis 
In the second stage, assuming interior solutions, we have the following first-order 
conditions: 
0
0 1 2
0
(2 ) 0U A q q q
q
             (1) 
1
0 1 2 1 0 1 2
1
3 ( ) 0U A q q q q q q
q
              (2) 
2
0 1 2 2 0 1 2
2
3 ( ) 0U A q q q q q q
q
              (3) 
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The second-order conditions are satisfied. From (2) or (3), we obtain the reaction 
function of the private firm. It is noteworthy that when ߙ௜ ൏ 1, the reaction curve has a 
negative slope, which implies that outputs are strategic substitutes . Also, as i  approaches 
1, the slope becomes less steep (and thus firm i’s best reply is less sensitive to the rivals’ 
output). When ߙ௜ ൐ 1, however, the reaction curve has a positive slope, which implies that 
outputs are strategic complements if the magnitude of CSR is high enough. It will affect the 
optimal choices of privatization policies. 
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously, we derive the equilibrium outputs as 
follows: 
* 1 2
0
1 2
(2 )( )
6 4 (1 )( )
Aq      
        
* 2 1
1 2
{(1 )(2 ) (3 ) }( )
2{6 4 (1 )( )}i
Aq        
          
* 1 2
2
1 2
{(1 )(2 ) (3 ) }( )
2{6 4 (1 )( )}
Aq        
              
*
1 2
2 (2 )( )
6 4 (1 )( )
AQ     
      
Note that CSR increases total industry outputs. Thus, when a CSR-firm places a higher 
weight on consumer surplus, it increases more outputs. 
After necessary calculations on the profits and consumer surplus, we obtain the 
following welfare *( )W   as a function of   and i .  
 
2 2
1 2 1 2
2
* 2
1 2 1 22
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
20 ( ) 8( )
( ) 72 4( ) 28( )
4 6 4 (1 )( )
52 7( ) 2 12( )
AW
    
              
                            
  (4) 
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In the first stage, when the government decides the optimal degree of privatization, we 
should consider the corner solutions because of the constraint 0 1  . Then, the analysis 
of maximizing welfare provides the following three cases. The first case is 
*(0) 0W
  , 
which implies that the optimum is * 0  , that is, nationalization. The second case is
*(1) 0W
  , which implies that the optimum is 
* 1  , that is, full privatization. The final 
case refers to partial privatization, which implies that the optimum is * (0,1)  . Then, it 
should satisfy the following first-order condition: 
*( ) 0W 
  . In that case, we obtain the 
following optimal degree of privatization in the interior solutions: 
* 1 2
1 2
( , )
( , )
B
D
    ,                            (5) 
where 2 21 2 1 2 1 25( ) 8( ) 2 4B            and 21 2 1 212 6( ) ( ) 0D          . Then, 
we obtain the following proposition.8 
Proposition 1 The optimal degree of privatization *  depends on i  and j .  
(i) * 0  (Nationalization) if 0B  . 
(ii) * 1  (Full Privatization) if B D . 
(iii) *0 1  (Partial Privatization) if 0D B  . 
[ Fig. 1. The Optimal Privatization ( 1 2, 0    and 1 20 2    ). ] 
Fig. 1 shows the optimal privatization policies when both private firms engage in CSR 
activities. It indicates that the shaded regions represent nationalization, the hatched regions 
                                                     
8 The proofs of propositions are provided in the Appendix. 
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represent full privatization, and non-shaded regions represent partial privatization. Note that 
partial privatization is not the optimum when either i  is very large or both i  and j  
are not too small. 
Next, we continue the analysis for two special, but interesting, cases. 
3.1. When both private firms have the homogenous CSR: 0 ൑ ߙଵ ൌ ߙଶ ൏ 1 
We consider the homogenous case that both CSR-firms have the same degree of CSR, 
that is, 0 ൑ ߙଵ ൌ ߙଶ ൌ ߙ ൏ 1. Then, from the first-order conditions (1) ~ (3) in the second-
stage, the reaction functions of each firm are as follows: 
1 2
0 2
A q qq 
   , 
0 2
1
(1 ) (1 )
3
A q qq  
      and 
0 1
2
(1 ) (1 )
3
A q qq  
      (6) 
Note that the strategies of all firms are strategic substitutes. As   increases, however, 
the output of the private firm becomes less sensitive to its rival’s output. 
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously, we derive the equilibrium outputs as 
follows: 
0
(1 )
3 2
Aq   
    , 1
(1 )
2(3 2 )
Aq    
     , 2
(1 )
2(3 2 )
Aq    
       
and (2 )
3 2
AQ   
    .                        (7) 
Again, CSR increases total industry outputs. Some comparative static effects with 
respect to   and   are as follows: 
0 00 , 0q q 
    , 
1 10 , 0q q 
    , 
2 20 , 0q q 
    , 0 , 0
Q Q
 
    . 
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These comparative static results show that an increase in the degree of CSR induces 
CSR-firms to produce more outputs, which in turn causes public firm to reduce its own 
output but increase the industry outputs. Meanwhile, an increase in the degree of 
privatization induces public firm to fewer outputs, which in turn, causes CSR firms to 
increase outputs, but reduces the industry outputs. 
The profits of the public firm and CSR firms are as follows: 
2 2
0 2
(1 ) (1 2 )
2(3 2 )
A     
     , 
2
1 2 2
(1 )(3 3 5 4 )
8(3 2 )
A         
         .      (8) 
Then, we obtain the following welfare as a function of   and  : 
2 2 2
2
(5 4 ) 2(9 7 ) 13 6 3
.
4(3 2 )
A
W
     
  
                  (9) 
Note that the welfare is decreasing (increasing) in α when the degree of CSR is high 
(low). That is, 0W
 
   when 
2
2
2 (0,1)
2 5 6
   
      
 . This result shows that a higher 
degree of CSR is not always beneficial to society. 
In the first stage, the optimal degree of privatization is provided by the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that 1 20 1      . The optimal degree of privatization is 
* 1max ,0
3
{ }   . 
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Proposition 2 implies that (i) the optimal degree of privatization is non-increasing in  , 
(ii) full privatization is never optimal, (iii) partial privatization is optimal when 1
3
  , and 
(iv) full nationalization is optimal when 1
3
  .  
We explain the intuition behind this result. An increase in  reduces the output of the 
public firm, increases that of each CSR-firm, and lowers the total output. In other words, an 
increase in  induces production substitutions from the public firm to the private CSR-
firms. This improves welfare as long as the marginal cost of the public firm is larger (i.e., 
the public firm produces more).9 When  is large, marginal costs of the CSR-firms are 
higher (i.e., each CSR-firm produces more than the public firm), and thus, privatization 
never improves welfare. This is why full nationalization is optimal when  is large. This 
result is in sharp contrast to that of Matsumura (1998) who showed that full nationalization 
is never optimal in mixed oligopolies. 
The smaller the value of  is, however, the higher the improvement in welfare because 
of the production substitution. This is why the optimal degree of privatization is non-
increasing in  . Consequently, full privatization is never optimal because partial 
privatization is optimal when 0  , as Matsumura (1998) showed. 
The monotone result in Proposition 2, however, depends on the assumption of 
homogenous objectives among the CSR-firms. Suppose that 2
1
2
   in Fig. 1, for example. 
Then, we find that when ߙଵ  is close to zero, partial privatization is optimal. As ߙଵ 
increases, the optimal privatization policy switches to full nationalization, then returns to 
                                                     
9 For an excellent explanation of the welfare-improving production substitution effect, see Lahiri and 
Ono (1988).  
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partial privatization, and finally switches to full privatization. This implies that the optimal 
degree of privatization can be non-monotone if we allow payoff heterogeneity between the 
CSR-firms. In the next subsection, we investigate the simplest and thus solvable case to 
illustrate this point.  
3.2. When one firm is a profit-maximizer: 2 10 2     
We consider a heterogeneous case in which one firm, say firm 2, is a pure profit-
maximizer and thus it does not participate in CSR activities, that is, 2 10 2    . Then, 
from the first order conditions (1) ~ (3) in the second-stage, the reaction functions of each 
firm are as follows: 
1 2
0 2
A q qq 
   , 
1 0 1 2
1
1
(1 ) (1 )
3
A q qq  
     , and  
0 1
2 3
A q qq   .   (10) 
Note that from the reaction function of CSR-firm 1, the rival’s output is a strategic 
substitute to the CSR-firm if 10 1  , while it is strategic complement if 11 2  . 
Furthermore, as 1  increases, the output of CSR-firm 1 is less sensitive to its rival’s output 
when 10 1  , while it is more sensitive when 11 2  . It represents that there exists a 
counter effect of CSR-firm, depending on the magnitude of CSR. 
Solving these reaction functions simultaneously, we derive the equilibrium outputs as 
follows: 
1
0
1 1
(2 )
6 4
Aq    
    , 
1 1
1
1 1
(2 2 3 )
2(6 4 )
Aq       
      , 
1 1
2
1 1
(2 2 )
2(6 4 )
Aq       
       ,  
and 
1 1
2 (2 )
6 4
AQ    
    .                (11) 
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Again, CSR increases total industry outputs. Some comparative static effects with 
respect to 1  and   are as follows: 
0 0
1
0 , 0q q 
    ,
1 1
1
0 , 0q q 
    ,
2 2
1
0 , 0q q 
    , 1
0 , 0Q Q 
    . 
These comparative static results show that an increase in the degree of CSR induces 
CSR-firm to produce more outputs, but both public and private firms reduce their outputs. 
However, it decreases the price of goods because the industry output increases. Meanwhile, 
an increase in the degree of privatization induces public firm to produce fewer outputs, but 
other private firms increase outputs, which in turn reduces the industry outputs. 
Then, this gives the following respective profits of each firm: 
2 2
1
0 2
1 1
(2 ) (1 2 )
2(6 4 )
A      
      , 
2
1 1 1 1
1 2
1 1
[(2 2 3 )(6 6 7 5 )]
8(6 4 )
A          
          and 
2 2
1
2 2
1 1
3[ (1 ) (2 )]
8(6 4 )
A      
              (12) 
Then, we obtain the following welfare as a function of ߙଵ and  : 
2 2
1 1 1 1
2
1 1
(2 ) (10 ) 4(9 ) 26 7
4(6 4 )
A
W
     
   
           .      (13) 
Note that the welfare is decreasing (increasing) in 1  when the magnitude of CSR is high 
(low). That is, 
1
0W
 
   when 
2
1 12
2 (0,1)
2( 3 3)
   
      
 . This result indicates that a 
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higher magnitude of CSR is not always beneficial to the society. In particular, if the 
magnitude of CSR is sufficiently high, the output of CSR-firm is too large for social welfare 
because the larger output of CSR-firm reduces the other firms’ outputs. Because the 
marginal cost of the CSR-firm is high due to its larger output, this production substitution 
from non-CSR firms to the CSR-firm is not beneficial to the society.  
In the first stage, the optimal degree of privatization is provided by the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3. Suppose that 2 10 2    . (i) When 1 40 3  , the optimal degree of 
privatization is 
2
* 1 1
1 1
5 8 4 .
12 (6 )
   
    Thus, partial privatization is optimal and it takes the 
U-shape in 1 . (ii) Otherwise, full privatization ( * 1  ) is optimal. 
[ Fig. 2. The Optimal Privatization when 2 10 2    . ] 
Proposition 3 implies that nationalization is never optimal under the heterogeneous case 
where one firm is a pure profit-maximizer but the other firm engages in CSR. For an 
expositional purpose, Fig.2 shows the optimal privatization when firm 1 is CSR-firm and 
firm 2 is a pure-profit-maximizer. It shows that as 1  increases, the optimal degree of 
privatization gradually decreases until 1  reaches ˆ , and then increases toward 1 until 
1  reaches 43  .  
Propositions 3 is in sharp contrast to Proposition 2. When private firms’ objectives are 
homogenous, full privatization is never optimal and the optimal degree of privatization is 
non-increasing in   (Proposition 2). In contrast, when one firm is concerned with CSR 
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and the other does not, full privatization can be optimal and the optimal degree of 
privatization is non-monotone (Proposition 3). We explain the intuition behind these 
results.10  
Suppose that 1.i  Because both private firms follow strategic substitution, an increase 
in   induces production substitution from the public firm to the private firms and it 
improves welfare as long as the marginal costs of the private firms are lower than those of 
the public firm (i.e., the public firm produces more than the private firms). At the same time, 
an increase in   reduces total output as well as welfare. The optimal degree of 
privatization is determined by these trade-offs between production substitution effect and 
total output effect. An increase in 1  makes the reaction curve of firm 1 less steep, and 
thus, firm 1’s output is less sensitive to firm 0’s. Therefore, a slight increase in 1 from zero 
weakens the welfare-improving production substitution effect, and thus reduces the optimal 
degree of privatization. When 1  becomes larger, the output of firm 2 is smaller and 
production substitution from firm 0 to firm 2 improves welfare more significantly. Thus, 
when 1  reaches the critical value, the optimal degree of privatization increases in 1  to 
stimulate the production of firm 2.  
On the other hand, suppose that 1 1  . Then, firm 1’s reaction curve has a positive 
slope, and its output is increasing in  . At this stage, firm 1’s production is too high from 
the viewpoint of social welfare. Although an increase in   reduces total output and it 
induces welfare loss, it increase the output of firm 2 and reduces the output of firm 1, and 
                                                     
10 A rigorous explanation is provided in the Appendix B. 
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both improve welfare. Therefore, an increase in 1  further improves welfare. When 
1
4
3
  , this effect is so strong that the optimal degree of privatization is one.  
4. Concluding remarks  
This paper investigates a mixed oligopoly in which one public firm competes with two 
private firms that may adopt CSR. This approach links two existing lines of related works. 
The first line comprises the literature on optimal privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly, 
and the second line refers to the literature on CSR. 
We find that, depending on the magnitude of CSR, full nationalization and partial or full 
privatization can be optimal privatization policies. In particular, we show that if private firms 
adopt a homogenous level of CSR, the optimal degree of privatization is non-increasing in 
the magnitude of CSR and full nationalization can be optimal whereas full privatization is 
never optimal. In contrast, if only one firm adopts CSR and the other is a profit-maximizer, 
the optimal degree of privatization is non-monotone with respect to the magnitude of CSR 
and full privatization can be optimal, whereas full nationalization is never optimal. Therefore, 
our results suggest that heterogeneity of objectives among private firms may play a crucial 
role in determining the optimal privatization policy.  
There remains future research. First, although we adopt a specific CSR approach, the 
basic principle should be applied to various model formulations. For example, if we adopt the 
CSR approach investigate by Ghosh and Mitra (2014) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2014), in 
which the rival’s profit is included in the CSR-firm’s objective, or the payoff interdependent 
approach discussed by Matsumura, et al. (2013) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015), we 
should check whether the principle similar to the one adopted in this paper can be applied.  
 17 
 
Second, the triopoly model is the simplest model to discuss the heterogeneity of 
objectives among the CSR-firms. Even in this simplest model, mathematical calculations are 
complicated and messy, which implies that it is difficult to treat a more general oligopoly 
model. However, as Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) suggested, the model with more than 
two private firms may yields a different implication in mixed oligopolies. Although 
examining a more general model is tough work, it may yield a new insight into this field. 
This remains for future research.  
Finally, we examine homogeneous products under quantity competition. However, 
undertaking CSR initiatives may affect other activities such as emission abatement activities 
or fair procurement. For example, Bian, et al. (2016) compared price and quantity 
competition under CSR incentives, and Hirose, et al. (2016, 2017) examined environmental 
corporate social responsibility under price competition. Extending our analysis to the 
endogenous choice between price and quantity also remains for future research. 
Appendix A: Proofs 
(i) Proof of Proposition 1. 
We check the three cases. (i) The condition 
*(0) 0W
   yields 0B  .  (ii) The condition 
*(1) 0W
   yields B D . (iii) When 0D B  , partial privatization is derived from the 
optimality condition 
*( ) 0W 
   in (5). ■ 
(ii) Proof of Proposition 2.  
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Using the same procedures in Proposition 1, we show that condition (1) 0W
   never 
holds. Condition (0) 0W
   shows that 
1
3
  . Otherwise, the first-order condition for 
an interior solution should satisfy the following condition:  
2
3
(1 )(1 3 3 ) 0.
2(3 2 )
W A   
   
                  
The second-order condition, 
2 *
2
( ) 0W 
  , is satisfied. Then, the optimal degree of 
privatization is * 1
3
   . ■ 
(iii) Proof of Proposition 3.  
Proof. Using the same procedures in Proposition 1, we show that condition (0) 0W
   
never holds. First, condition (1) 0W
   shows that 1
4
3
  . Otherwise, the first-order 
condition for an interior solution should satisfy the following condition: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
3
1 1
(2 )[( 6 12) 5 8 4] 0.
2(6 4 )
W A      
    
                (A1) 
The second-order condition, 
2
2 0
W

  , is satisfied.  
From (15) we obtain  
2
* 1 1
1 1
5 8 4 .
12 (6 )
   
                    (A2) 
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The optimal solution is partial privatization, where *0 1   if 1 40 3  . Further, if 
1
40
3
  , we obtain  
2*
1 1
2 2
1 1 1
2(19 64 36) 0
( 6 12)
 
  


       when 1
32 2 85ˆ 0.713
19
    .  
However, if 1
4
3
  , * 1   and it is invariant with 1 . ■ 
Appendix B: Rigorous Explanations on Proposition 3 
We present a more detailed explanation. We examine the sign of 
*
1



 . Let 1( )W   
satisfy the optimal condition in (A1). Then, from the implicit function theorem and the 
second-order condition of optimality, the sign of 
*
1



 is the same as that of 1
W


 . Then, we 
obtain the following relations: 
1
0W
 
   if 
2 4 3 2
1 2
2 13 22 28 164 333 260 52
2(2 8 9)W
        
          .  
The result confirms Proposition 3 in that the relation between 1  and *  is U-shaped, 
depending on the degree of CSR, 1 . Using this fact, we provide the economic explanation 
with regard to Proposition 3. 
When 1  increases, 1q  increases but both 2q  and 0q  decrease. Then, we have
1 1
1 1
q q
 
   . Again, a higher degree of CSR activities by firm 1 leads to an increase in the 
total industry output, and thus, the production substitution effect is beneficial to consumer 
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surplus. However, when 1  increases, firm 1 has to pay a higher cost while its rival firms 
can save their costs. This points to the existence of the cost reallocation effect. Therefore, 
the welfare effect also depends on the trade-off between the production substitution effect 
and the cost reallocation effect. In particular, if 1 W  , the relation between 1  and *  
is negative, and thus the production substitution effect is dominated by the cost reallocation 
effect. However, the production substitution effect dominates the cost reallocation effect if 
1 1   , while the production substitution effect is outweighed by the cost reallocation effect 
if 1 1    in Fig. 2. 
Therefore, when deciding the optimal degree of privatization, the welfare effect depends 
on 1 . On the one hand, when 1 1   , and thus when the public firm produces more 
output than the other private firms, welfare increases as 1  increases because the 
production substitution effect dominates cost reallocation effect. Thus, the government 
decreases the degree of privatization in order to increase the outputs of firm 0 and the 
industry, that is, 0 0q q 
   . This will decrease the marginal output substitution effect 
but increase the marginal cost reallocation effect, so that the two marginal benefits will be 
the same at a lower level of privatization.  
On the other hand, when 1 1    and thus the CSR-firm 1 produces more output than 
the other private and public firms, welfare decreases as 1  increases because the 
production substitution effect is outweighed by cost reallocation effect. In that case, we have 
three cases.  
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First, when 1 ˆ    , at which ˆ  satisfies * W  , welfare decreases as 1  
increases. In that case, the output difference between CSR-firm 1 and the public firm is 
relatively small. Thus, the government still decreases the degree of privatization in order to 
increase the outputs of firm 0 and the industry, that is, 0 0q q 
   . This will increase the 
marginal production substitution effect, which is larger than the increment of the marginal 
cost reallocation effect. Thus, the two marginal benefits will be the same at a lower level of 
privatization. 
Second, however, when 1ˆ    , welfare increases as 1  increases. In that case, 
the output difference between CSR-firm 1 and the public firm is relatively large. Then, the 
government increases the degree of privatization in order to decrease the output of firm 0, 
which induces an increase in other firms’ outputs but a decrease in industry outputs, that is, 
0 0q q
 
   . This will decrease marginal benefit of the production substitution effect. In 
that case, however, the CSR-firm is less sensitive to the change in the public firm, and thus, 
it will decrease the marginal cost reallocation effect even further. Thus, the two marginal 
benefits will be the same at a higher degree of privatization. Note that if 11 2  , the 
output of the public firm is a complement, and as 1  increases, the output of CSR-firm 1 
becomes more sensitive. Thus, the positive relations between 1  and *  becomes steeper, 
as 1  increases. 
Finally, when 1  , the government chooses * 1  ,namely full privatization, which 
means that it cannot increase the degree of privatization any further. Therefore, *  takes a 
U-shape in 1 . 
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